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1. It is well known that the celebrated K-K-M theorem 
(Knaster et al. [4]) on closed coverings of a simplex is equivalent to 
Brouwer’s fixed-point theorem. Recently, Shapley [8] used the “path- 
follwing” technique of Lemke and Howson [5] and Scarf [6,7], to establish 
a generalization of the K-K-M theorem. The generalized result is here called 
the K-K-M-S theorem, which is interesting in its own right. The purpose of 
the present note is to show that the K-K-M-S theorem is a simple conse- 
quence of a theorem of Ky Fan on a generalization of Kakutani’s fixed-point 
theorem. The present author would like to acknowledge that the essential 
idea of this note is borrowed from Kannai [ 3 ]. 
2. An element x of the n-dimensional Euclidean space R” is iden- 
tified with a column vector (x, ,..., x,)‘. Denote the set { 1,2 ,..., n} by N, and 
the family of non-empty subsets of N by J’“. For each j E N, define the unit 
vector e/ E R” by: e:’ = 0 for i E N\{j}; and e$ = 1. For each S E JY, define 
xs = Cm 8, and As = the convex hull of {$ / j E S}. A collection 9 of 
members of J” is called balanced, if there is y, > 0 for each S E 9 such that 
&Ed YSXS = XN- 
K-K-M-S THEOREM (Shapley). Let (CsJseuK- be a family of closed 
subsets of AN, indexed by the members of M, such that for each T E .M, AT c 
c scr S’ Then, there exists u balanced collection 9 for which 
SESJ cs + 0. 
* A revised version of: T. Ichiishi, “On Scarfs Theorem for Non-Emptiness of the Core,” 
GSIA Working Paper No. 9-78-79, Carnegie-Mellon University, September 1978. After I 
completed the original version, Michael J. Todd showed me his unpublished lecture note. 
which contains a related, but independent result. (See Section 3 of the present version.) I 
would like to thank him for doing so. Financial support from the National Science Foun- 
dation of the U.S.A., under Grant SOC 78-06123, is also gratefully acknowledged. 
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It should be noted that if C, = 0 for every S for which #S > 2, then the 
above theorem is reduced to the K-K-M theorem. 
Non-constructive proof of the K-K-M-S theorem. Denote by I(x) the 
collection (S E X’I C, 3 x), and define a correspondence G: AN + AN by: 
G(x) = {<E A”‘] There exists y, > 0 for each S E Z(x) such that <= 
CsEltXj y,xs.). It is trivial to check that G is upper semi-continuous, and is 
non-empty- and convex-valued. So is a constant correspondence F, defined 
by: F(x) = {(l/n) xN}. Let x be in the relative interior of A’ for some T # N. 
Then, by the assumption there is S c T such that C, 3 x (i.e., SE Z(x)). 
This means that v = ( l/#S)xs E G(x). Put u = (l/n)X, E F(x), and define 
W’ = A(u - v) +x for any positive real number 1. Then, Ci,, wf = 1; wf = 
-A( l/#S - l/n) + xi, if i E S; and wf > 0, if i E N\S. Since xi > 0 for all 
iET, it follows that w* E AN for any A such that 0 < I < 
Min{x,/(l/#S - l/n) ] i E S). Thus, all the conditions of Fan [ 1, Theorem 61 
are satisfied, and there exists x* E AN such that F(x*) n G(x*) # 0, i.e., 
(l/n)X, E G(x*). Therefore, 1(x*) is balanced. Needless to say, 
n SEf(X’) cs 3 x*- 
Q.E.D. 
3. Shapley [8] then applied the K-K-M-S theorem to give an alter- 
native proof of Scarfs theorem in [6] for non-emptiness of the core; the 
core is a typical solution concept for cooperative games in characteristic 
function form without sidepayments. Therefore, the present note also supplies 
a simple proof of the Scarf theorem. In a recent paper [2], the present author 
constructed an abstract model of a society in which each member can 
cooperate with others by forming a coalition, but at the same time can be 
influenced by the members outside the coalition; proposed a new concept of 
equilibrium, called a social coalitional equilibrium; and provided a sufficient 
condition under which such equilibria exist. The new equilibrium concept 
can be considered as a synthesis of the Nash equilibrium (a typical non- 
cooperative solution concept) and the core (a typical cooperative solution 
concept). The technique developed in the present note turned out essential for 
the existence proof in Ichiishi [2]. 
Todd [9] showed that the following special case of the K-K-M-S 
theorem can be proven directly by Kakutani’s fixed-point theorem: Let 
ICSIS,,, be a closed covering of AN, indexed by the members of M, such that 
[S, TE JV, C, n AT # 1~11 implies [S c T]. Then, there exists a balanced 
collection 9 for which &E,d C, # 0. This is not a generalization of the 
K-K-M theorem, but it is strong enough to establish the Scarf theorem. 
Thus, Kakutani’s fixed-point theorem is enough for proving the Scarf 
theorem. However, if one wants to prove the social coalitional equilibrium 
existence theorem, by using either this last theorem or the K-K-M-S 
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theorem, Theorem 6 of Fan [l] has to be used, since it has more ingredient 
in it: i.e.. use of upper demi-continuity, rather than upper semi-continuity. 
REFERENCES 
I. K. FAN. Extension of two fixed point theorems of F. E. Browder. Math. 2. 112 (1969), 
234-240. 
2. T. ICHIISHI, A social coalitional equilibrium existence lemma, Econometrica 49 (198 I ). 
369-377. 
3. Y. KANNAI. On closed coverings of simplexes, SIAM J. Appl. Math. 18 (1970), 459461. 
4. B. KNASTER. C. KURATOWSKI, AND S. MAZURKIEWICZ. Ein Beweis des Fixpunktsatzes fiir 
n-dimensional simplexe, Fund. Mar/z. 14 (1929), 132-137. 
5. C. E. LEMKE AND J. T. HOWSON. Equilibrium points of bi-matrix games, SIAM J. Appl. 
Math. 12 (1964), 413423. 
6. H. SCARF. The core of an n person game, Econometrica 35 (1967), 50-69. 
7. H. SCARF. “The Computation of Economic Equilibria,” Yale Univ. Press, New Haven. 
1973. 
8. L. S. SHAPLEY. On balanced games without side payments, in “Mathematical Program- 
ming” (T. C. Hu and S. M. Robinson, Eds.), pp. 261-290, Academic Press, New York, 
1973. 
9. M. TODD. Lecture note, School of Operations Research and Industrial Engineering. Cornell 
University. Spring 1978. 
